I . Introduction
During the 1920's, a professional, systematic
approach to quality improvement (QI) began to evolve in US manufacturing. Following WW II, American quality experts were
invited to Japan to address the topic of quality improvement. The Japanese subsequently undertook a decades long
drive for Total Quality Improvement (TQI) that incorporated and expanded the ideas
presented by the American experts. By the
late 1970's, the Japanese had used quality so successfully against the US that the
American electronics and automotive industries were forced to adopt a strategy of "if
you can't lick 'em, join 'em."
II. San Jose Medical Group
US health care, facing severe restructuring, is
reluctantly attempting to implement manufacturing style TQI.
Unlike
manufacturing, health care is not faced with a major Japanese competitive threat. The primary motivation for adopting TQI in health
care is the belief that it will reduce expenses by ten to thirty-five percent or more. This is very attractive to hospitals who, like the
US railroads in times past, have seen the need for their services reduced (and experienced
a corresponding loss in profits) due to advances in other segments of their own industry. By practicing QI hospitals expect to become more
efficient and thus remain a part of the industry they have led for so long.
One
exception to this hospitals only trend is the San Jose Medical Group (SJMG). The organization was founded more than thirty
years ago. It serves a patient base of
125,000 with nine locations. It has a staff
of more than seventy doctors and 350 nurse and administrative personnel. Though their 1990 revenues exceeded $25,000,000,
they experienced a significant financial loss in 1990.
This prompted the Board of Directors to bring in new management in October 1990.
The
new CEO spent the first few months getting to know the stakeholders (primarily the doctors
employed by the Group) and stabilizing the situation (e.g., avoiding a layoff by having
the line of credit extended to provide sufficient cash for payroll in the immediate months
ahead). The results of this initial "get
acquainted" effort (which included a formal survey of the doctors) showed widespread
systemic malfunction. The organization's
basic administrative processes (e.g., accounts receivable, patient registration, medical
records management, etc.) were failing daily. This,
in turn, meant having to expend valuable resources doing rework.
In
addition to this obvious waste, the organization was struggling to become a provider of
managed care which meant they had to lower their internal costs substantially. Consequently, they seemed like an ideal candidate
for initiating quality improvement activities. The
medical and management staff were introduced to the concepts of QI. Once oriented, they readily agreed to begin a
pilot QI effort.
III.
SJMG Quality Improvement Team for Medical Records
Quality improvement at SJMG involved forming a QIT
and following a simple nine step plan.
The
SJMG QIT followed the simple nine step plan shown in Figure A. Team meetings were scheduled weekly for ninety
minutes. Before recounting that experience,
it should be noted that a decision was made at the outset to provide "just in
time" training for the team members. That
decision took advantage of the fact that the team would be led during its early stages by
a seasoned meeting facilitator who also was expert in quality improvement techniques. At the point in time the group encountered a
situation that it was not trained to handle, it was the facilitator's duty to train them
personally (or arrange for their training) during a regularly scheduled team meeting. This approach can be expensive but maximizes the
probability of retaining the training material and gaining mastery of the techniques.
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The QIT activities were:
1. Select the area to improve: To ensure success, an organization normally targets a
"safe" (easy) process for its pilot QI effort. But the CEO felt it was critical
to improve the medical records process quickly. The retrieval and management of patient
medical records was particularly troublesome to the specialist doctors. Without a
patient's medical record, specialist clinical care could not always be rendered reliably.
If care was given without access to the patient's medical record, the doctor increased the
risk of malpractice.
Management had taken some spot measurements that
led them to believe that the care of as many as eighty patients per day were affected by
this situation.
If QI methods could be employed
successfully to improve a process that was so visible to the doctors, then acceptance of
QI as the vehicle for dealing with other defective processes in the organization would
undoubtedly follow. Therefore, the CEO chose the medical records process. |
2. Designate the team members: The medical
records process spanned several functional organizations (e.g., lab, x-ray, the branches,
nursing, administration, courier, the hospital, etc.) and thus presented a particularly
difficult challenge regarding who should be on the QIT. Rather than attempt to address all
the membership issues at once, the initial team membership was decided upon during a QI
orientation presentation to personnel in the main medical records filing function. The
personnel were so empowered by the idea that management would involve them in decisions
about their work that the most respected among them were immediately nominated to be QIT
members. Realizing that step five in the QIT plan would call for adjusting team
membership, management felt comfortable launching the QIT with only the personnel drawn
from the medical records functional group.
During this orientation meeting, a group
discussion ensued which resulted in the formal QIT objective being defined as
"Develop and implement the changes necessary to ensure that no patient is seen
without a medical record."
| Since the
team membership was composed of both managers and nonmanagers, the first team meeting
focused on development of rules for how the members would interact with each other. They
unanimously agreed on the meeting rules shown in the inset. |
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Meeting Rules
- No Rank, Each Will Be Treated as a Peer
- One Conversation, No Side Conversations
- No Criticism, Ask Only Clarifying Questions
- All Ideas Will Be Recorded So All Can See
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| 3.
Flow
chart, measure, and stabilize the process: The team members were asked to get together
before the first meeting and flow chart the existing process for retrieving and filing
medical records. That flow chart was the subject of the initial meeting. And, since no one
person (not even the manager) knew all the steps involved in handling some chart
situations, a lively discussion occurred. After several meetings, they eventually agreed
upon the flow chart shown in Figure B. This step produced many ideas about possible
actions to take and they were recorded by the team recorder for possible use later. Next, it was necessary to measure the overall process. However, that wasn't readily possible since not
everyone involved in the process was represented on the team (e.g., nursing). |
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| Nonetheless, a group consensus
existed that identified the retrieval of records from the various branches as the most
severe problem. And, since the data for five
of the eight branches could be done without involving others, its collection was
immediately initiated. |
| The
measurement consisted of recording the daily volume of charts requested from the branches
as well as the number actually received. Any not received were counted as
"defects." The defect data for
the first seven weeks of 1991 is shown in Figure C. The upper control limit (UCL) of
twelve was computed by assuming a Poisson data distribution. (As a check, an alternative
computation that yielded a UCL of thirteen was made by assuming a normal distribution
existed after the outliers were discarded.) The two peaks (outliers) of eighteen and
thirteen were investigated and confirmed to be due to the same special variation: the
employees who process the requests in a given branch were not available (e.g., due to
vacation, illness, etc.) to do the work on either of those days. |
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| In an
attempt to see if there was a correlation between the number of charts requested and the
number of defects, a scatter diagram was plotted (see Figure D). Its horizontal nature
shows there is no correlation. This was confirmed visually by plotting the same data on
the y-axis versus time on the x-axis (see Figure E). Intuition says that if the defect
count correlates to the workload (requests), then the defects should increase on days of
high requests. The lack of correlation was confirmed by noting that the defect peak of
eighteen coincided with a request low point of 115! There was speculation among some QIT members that the defects might correlate
with the patient work load in the branch office that failed to forward the requested
chart. That was noted for later follow-up. |
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| 4.
Apply the customer-supplier model: At this point the group identified the inputs and
outputs to the process along with the responsible party. Although it might seem obvious
that the branches were suppliers, it was not so obvious that nursing was the customer.
This idea required a mind-set change by some medical records personnel since relations
with nursing were strained. Next, the group
formalized the input and output requirements. There were three types of requests for which
requirements had to be documented: routine appointments (3 days notice); adds (less than
three days notice, e.g., to handle a walk-in); and, sometimes, the request was urgent
("stat" - less than two hours notice). The customer-supplier information is
shown in Figure F. |
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5. Adjust team membership: At this point
management reviewed the team membership. Initially, it had been set based on management's
guess that personnel from the medical records department should comprise the team. But now
additional information had been developed about whom should participate. For instance, it
was suggested that the"customer" (nursing) be on the team. As should the
"supplier" (branch clinics). In addition, since there was more work than one
team could handle, it was decided to split the team into two groups: one (the Branch team)
to work on the branch related issues, and one (the Appointments team) to work on items
related to the rest of the process. To coordinate the two efforts, two medical records
personnel (one supervisor and one clerk) were assigned membership on both teams. The
Branch team was expanded to include three of the eight branch managers. The Appointments
team was expanded to include two nurses and, later in the project, two doctors.
To fit the schedules of the nurse and doctor team
members, the Appointments team meeting time was set for Wednesdays from noon to 1:30 p.m.
This, combined with the fact that there was the possibility of being assigned tasks by the
team, might have dampened the desire to participate. That, however, was not true. The
potential dampening was offset by the empowerment that the team members felt when asked to
participate in solving a personally frustrating problem that had plagued the organization
for years and that involved decision making about how their work was done.
6. Designate a process owner: SJMG was
functionally organized but the medical records retrieval process was cross functional.
Nonetheless, one person was assigned as the "owner" for the Branch process and
another as the "owner" for the Appointments process. The assignment, however,
was not declared by fiat. Instead, participative management techniques were employed to
ensure maximum buy-in by all team members. The position of process owner carried matrix
management powers with it but did not have the clout that goes with being a functional
manager. Therefore, cooperation of all concerned was important if the person selected were
to have the best chance for succeeding.
7. Identify the measures of performance: The
initial measurements taken in step three had focused on the number of branch charts
requested and the number received. The number not received (defects) was then calculated
as the difference. This data was also accumulated for a few weeks for the Appointments
process. Nursing was asked to gather the Appointments data so the team would have a
"customer" perspective. However, this meant additional work for data that
probably wouldn't be used. Therefore, this approach was soon dropped in favor of only
counting the defects (charts that weren't received by nursing by the time needed). This
latter approach was much simpler since a "chart request" document existed for
every chart ordered by nursing. Both nursing and medical records personnel kept the counts
and they were reconciled daily.
| 8.
Identify the possible cause factors: The QITs used a cause-and-effect diagram (see
Figure G) to brainstorm the possible reasons for not being able to retrieve a chart. This
information was used to design a Branch check sheet (see Figure H). Room was left on the
check sheet to write in additional reasons as they were encountered. Each time a defect
occurred, a copy of the related chart request form was made and a notation made regarding
the reason the chart had not been retrieved. This information was tallied daily using the
check sheet. The data for the most recent period (usually two weeks) was then tabulated
and plotted on a Pareto diagram (see Figure I). |
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| A similar
check sheet (not shown) was developed for the Appointments process with the exception that
specialist doctor names were used instead of branch clinic locations. Information for a
two week period was compiled in a Pareto diagram (see Figure J). 9. Continuous Improvement Cycle:
After 10 weeks of
QIT activity, the process was determined to be stable so it was decided to initiate The
first repeated cycles of improvement. |
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9.1 Establish Requirements: The cost of
defects (rework in this case) was estimated to exceed $50,000 annually (i.e., more than
one full time employee). This estimate was based on the fact that when a chart did not
arrive as requested, nursing time was expended on the phone with the appropriate branch
arranging for elements of the chart to be sent via FAX to the main clinic.
In addition to the nurse time, investigation
revealed that the medical records personnel often would detect the pending defect
situation and, in an attempt to avoid it, would repeat the process of requesting the
chart. These follow-up chart requests, even though they were handled via telephone,
usually met with failure as well. The large volume of charts requiring this special
handling made the total cost quite high.
Informal discussions with medical records
employees revealed chart retrieval work to be so frustrating that they would occasionally
take a "sick" day rather than come into work. The estimated cost of defects did
not include this cost of employee absence. Nor did it include any cost associated with
employee turnover even though management felt more than one employee had left because of
the frustrating work environment. Neither did it quantify the cost associated with having
to reschedule patients rather than administer care without the chart. (This latter
situation had the potential to become lost revenue entirely.) Nor did the cost of defects
include the fact that the frustration of working in a defective process lowered the
self-esteem of the medical records personnel and, therefore, productivity was not what it
should be. Neither was it possible to quantify accurately the cost associated with the
expenditure of doctor and management time to deal with complaints by irate doctors. (One
doctor who recently left the organization cited the inability to consistently obtain
medical records as a factor influencing his departure.) When these additional factors are
considered the cost of defects could easily exceed $75,000 annually. And to that must be
added a cost associated with the risk of malpractice.
| The Pareto
diagram for Appointments (Figure J) revealed that more than forty percent of the overall
failures were due to failures in the branch subprocess. And the previous Pareto diagram
for Branch failures (see Figure I) revealed that about sixty percent of the branch
failures were attributed to the branch just not responding to a request for a chart
("no response"). This was concluded to be a procedural and training issue. Once
corrected, the general situation was expected to improve by more than twenty-five percent.
Therefore, it was decided that the first cycle of continuous improvement should focus on
eliminating the "no response" condition entirely. |
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9.2 Implement Changes: The team decided
the primary change needed was increased awareness about the importance of forwarding a
chart immediately upon request. The first step in increasing awareness was to invite more
branch managers to join the team. In addition, it was decided that the data that was being
collected would be published monthly to provide feedback to each branch about how well it
was doing. Additional steps included half day working visits to each branch by medical
records personnel. Branch personnel reciprocated by visiting the main facility and viewing
the operations there.
The team also targeted the lack of formalized
procedures and began to develop and implement those as time permitted. The procedure for
the Branch process included the requirement that the clinic operations officer be notified
immediately upon the occurrence of a "no response" condition by a branch. It was
the duty of the operations officer to then personally contact the responsible branch
manager for an explanation.
The detailed list of action items that had been
initiated in step three began to grow quite rapidly. It now included action due dates and
the name(s) of the person responsible for achieving them. The weekly meetings often became
consumed with reviewing all open action items as well as the ones completed since the last
meeting. Any remaining time was devoted to a review of the weekly performance data and
brainstorming and new action items.
| 9.3
Measure Results: The measurement continued daily (see Figure K). Progress was
painfully slow since no sooner would one branch achieve improvement than another one would
degrade. Every time a special variation occurred, it was investigated and almost
invariably found to be due to insufficient trained staffing. 9.4 Achieve Target:
The Branch team achieved
elimination of the "no response" condition after about fourteen weeks into the
effort. Their accomplishment, coupled with other improvements attained by the Appointments
team, resulted in the achievement of zero defects for the clinic as a whole (see Figure
L). |
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| Though many action items were
achieved, the written procedures were still being developed at the time this report was
written. In addition, only the passage of time will confirm management's continued
commitment to keeping the process in control. Thus, the final results of the first
continuous improvement cycle must await a follow-up report. Once the final step of the first cycle of continuous
improvement is achieved, the plan calls for retesting the validity of the cause factors
(Step 8) and the measures of performance (Step 9). That too must await a follow-up report. |
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IV Conclusion
SJMG management did not have the knowledge needed to improve the medical records retrieval
process. However, once the employees were invited to address the situation via a formal
QIT setting, that knowledge became readily available. Interestingly, the team assigned
nearly all the action items to the management members of the QIT. Management's willingness
to carry out these assignments not only ensured the success of the QIT but greatly
improved the morale of all medical records personnel. During the two weeks before
achievement of zero defects, doctors and management not included in the QIT effort
commented on the noticeable improvement in the self-esteem of the medical records
personnel.
The factors deemed critical to the success of the
medical records QIT activity were:
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Treatment of the team members, particularly
the non managers, as peers;
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The commitment and actual implementation by
doctors and management of the tasks assigned by the team;
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Flowcharting and measurement of the process
coupled with utilization of SPC and the other technical analysis QI tools, particularly
the Pareto diagram;
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Disciplined adherence to the weekly meeting
time and duration;
- Utilization of an experienced meeting
facilitator who also was a QI expert;
The idea of managing the medical records
retrieval process as if it were a manufacturing production line was new to the
organization. But the staff readily accepted the idea and did not need much training to
implement it. The use of SPC and related quantitative tools provided undisputed grounds
for prioritizing changes to implement and, later, for deciding which changes were
effective. The tools involved were not difficult for the QIT members to learn in spite of
the fact most were not college graduates.
A far more difficult skill to teach has been that
of team facilitator. Yet, even that skill was being acquired by a couple of individuals
who should become sufficiently proficient after a few more weeks to run the meetings. Once
that occurs, both QITs will be able to function with only occasional outside assistance.
The success of the project was evident to
management even before it was achieved and as a result they immediately initiated two more
QITs: one focused on patient registration and the other focused on accounts receivable.
Both these are following the same action plan, and, although not as far along as the
medical records QIT, have been experiencing similar success. Word of the medical records
QIT success has spread throughout the organization and, consequently, membership on these
later teams has become something of an honor.
A "quality council" has been formed and
is meeting once a week with the objective of integrating continuous QI into the
organization as part of its permanent culture. Its membership includes two SJMG board
members (both are physicians), the medical director, and two physician department chairs.
It also includes the director of nursing and several executives from administration.
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